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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN THE OVER-THE-
COUNTER SECURITIES MARKETS: IMPLIED
LIABILITIES BASED ON NASD RULES
Lewis D. Lowenfelst
The author focuses upon a new and intriguing theory of civil liability
based upon Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. He sug-
gests that a private action under the above section may be maintained
by investors injured as a proximate result of violations of rules promulgated
by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. for the direct
protection of the investing public. Such a private action is necessary, the
author suggests, if the investing public is to be fully protected in dealings
in the over-the-counter securities market.
INTRODUCTION
As originally enacted, the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 was de-
signed primarily to regulate the trading of securities on national securities
exchanges. Gradually, however, the original scope of the act was extended
to apply with equal impact to the over-the-counter securities markets.
First, the Maloney Act2 was passed in 1938. This law, which was incor-
porated as section ISA3 of the 1934 act, codified the concept of cooperative
regulation of over-the-counter markets by government and industry. Reg-
ulation was accomplished by permitting qualified associations of broker-
dealers to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission as
"national securities associations." A registered association had to be ap-
propriately organized, its rules had to be designed to meet certain
standards and to achieve certain objectives, and it was required to
discipline members who violated its rules.4 The first, and to date the
only, association to become registered pursuant to section 15A was
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B., Harvard University, 1957; LL.B., 1961. The author
wishes to thank Michael S. Barron, Esq., David L. Marks, Esq., Leslie Susser, Esq. and Fern
Lowenfels for their helpful suggestions in connection with the preparation of this article.1 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
2 Securities Exchange Act § 15A, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3
(1964).
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD). Today,
the membership of the NASD is nationwide. It includes virtually all
broker-dealers engaged in a general securities business and represents
wide diversities in financial resources, standards and activities.
The next major statutory development in the regulation of the over-
the-counter securities markets was the enactment of the Investment
Company Act in 1940.1 Under this statute the activities of companies
engaged primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting and trading
in securities and whose own securities were held by the investing public,
were subjected to statutory limitations and to SEC regulation in accord-
ance with prescribed standards deemed necessary to protect the interests of
investors and the public. Since the securities of most of these companies
were traded exclusively in the over-the-counter markets, the regulatory
impact was much greater in this area than with respect to securities
exchanges.
The third step in this gradual statutory development was taken with
the 1964 Securities Acts amendments. 6 Here, the reporting, proxy and
insider trading provisions of the 1934 act, which formerly applied only
to listed companies, were extended to apply to a large number of compa-
nies traded exclusively in the over-the-counter markets.
Concomitant with this development of increased regulation of the
over-the-counter securities markets has been an expansion of implied
liabilities and remedies pursuant to the 1934 act. In 1944 a private ac-
tion against the New York Stock Exchange based on section 6 was sus-
tained." In 1946 implied liabilities were held to exist pursuant to the
broad fraud provisions of section 10(b) of the act and rule 10b-5 pro-
mulgated thereunder.8 Three years later an investor's right to bring a pri-
vate action based on the margin requirements of section 7(c) was
upheld.9 During the same year a private action under the disclosure pro-
visions of section 11(d)(2) was recognized, 10 and shortly thereafter a
similar action based on the unlisted trading requirements of section 12 (f)
was sustained." The climax came in 1964 when the Supreme Court
recognized a private action based upon the proxy requirements of section
14 of the 1934 act.1
5 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-52 (1964).
6 Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1964).
7 Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
8 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
9 Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
10 Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104 (Wi). Ark. 1949).
11 Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Midwest Stock Exch., 178 F. Supp. 669 (N.). InI. 1959).
12 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); see Chicago So. Shore & So. B.R.R. v.
Monon R.R., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 91,525 (N.D. Ill. 1965), where a private action under
§ 16(a) was sustained.
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This article is concerned with an action which would appear to be the
logical extension or merger of the two trends described above-a private
action pursuant to the rules of a securities association registered under
section 15A of the 1934 act. The over-the-counter securities market, with
its diffuseness and heterogeneity, its diversities in the character and stan-
dards of the companies traded as well as of the persons trading, would
seem to be the ideal place to emphasize the concept of private enforce-
ment. For the SEC, the NASD, or any state regulatory agency to attempt
to control this sprawling, complex market without in the process creating
a vast bureaucratic machine would be virtually impossible. If, however,
the private investor is permitted to initiate a private action pursuant to
section 15A, the entire investing public becomes the enforcement agency.
Each individual investor, as a by-product of protecting his own interests
and seeking his own private remedies, will serve as a discloser of, as well
as a deterrent to, wrongdoing in these markets.
THE STATUTE
Any discussion as to whether or not a private action may be maintained
based on the rules of a registered securities association must begin with an
analysis of the relevant statutory provisions. The arguments in favor of
permitting such an action may be set out as follows.
First, it appears clear that such an action would be consistent with the
purpose of the act as stated in the preamble---"to prevent inequitable and
unfair practices on [securities] . . . exchanges and [over-the-counter]
markets .... ,,s Investors would be able to redress damages suffered,
and brokers would be deterred from disregarding the standards of the act.
As a precondition to registration, section 15A(b) (8) requires a securi-
ties association to adopt rules, binding upon the membership, which are:
[D]esigned to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to provide safeguards
against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or other
charges, and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest, and
to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market .... 14
Thus the act, through the agency of the securities association, is impos-
ing duties upon member firms for the benefit of the investing public. Pur-
suant to section 27, an action may be "brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder."' 5
13 Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
14 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b) (8), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b) (8) (1964).15 Securities Exchange Act § 27, 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
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Therefore, an action brought by a member of the investing public against
a member firm to redress damages caused by violations of NASD rules,
is an action to enforce a duty created by the statute within the meaning
of section 27.
Section 15A(b) requires SEC approval of the rules of a securities asso-
ciation as a precondition to registration.16 Section 15A(j) provides that
before such rules may be changed, the proposed changes must be ap-
proved by the SEC. 7 Section 15A(k)(1) gives the SEC the power to
abrogate association rules if "it appears to the Commission that such abro-
gation is necessary... to assure fair dealing by the members of such asso-
ciation ... or otherwise to protect investors or effectuate the purposes
of this title."18 Section 15A(k) (2) empowers the Commission to alter or
supplement the rules of a registered securities association in certain speci-
fied instances.'9 And experience shows that the SEC has not been loath
to exercise its authority pursuant to these statutory provisions20 Where
the SEC has such sweeping powers over association rules, these rules are
virtually rules of the SEC itself, and'should grant the same rights to in-
vestors as SEC rules grant. Since private actions may be maintained based
on SEC rules, the same actions should be sustained based on NASD rules.
In 1952 the SEC "disapproved" a proposed NASD rule dealing with
the trading activities of employees of member firms, pending determina-
tion as to whether the SEC would adopt its own rule in the same area.2'
16 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b), 52 Stat. 1071 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b) (1964).
17 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(j), 52 Stat. 1074 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
3(j) (1964).
18 Securities Exchange Act § ISA(k)(1), 52 Stat. 1074 (1938), as amended, 15 UVS.C.
§ 78o-3(k)(1) (1964).
19 Securities Exchange Act § 1SA(k)(2), 52 Stat. 1074 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(k)(2) (1964), provides:
(2) The Commission may in writing request any registered securities association to adopt
any specified alteration of or supplement to its rules with respect to any of the matters
hereinafter enumerated. If such association fails to adopt such alteration or supplement
within a reasonable time, the Commission is authorized by order to alter or supplement
the rules of such association in the manner theretofore requested, or with such modifica-
tions of such alteration or supplement as it deems necessary if, after appropriate notice
and opportunity for hearing, it appears to the Commission that such alteration or sup-
plement is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors
or to effectuate the purposes of this section, with respect to-
(A) the basis for, and procedure in connection with, the denial of membership or the
barring from being associated with a member or the disciplining of members or persons
associated with members, or the qualifications required for members or natural persons
associated with members or any class thereof.
(B) the method for adoption of any change in or addition to the rules of the associa-
tion.
(C) the method of choosing officers and directors.
(D) affiliation between registered securities associations.
20 National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 20 S.E.C. 508 (1945); National Ass'n of Sec. Deal-
ers, Inc. 17 S.E.C. 459 (1944); National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 12 S.E.C. 322 (1942);
National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. 9 S.E.C. 38 (1941).
21 SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4723 (1952).
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After a period had elapsed, during which the SEC's rule was submitted
for public comment, the SEC determined to withdraw its proposal and
allow the NASD rule to become effective.22 "Thus," wrote the Commis-
sion, "the Association and its members take primary responsibility for
the supervision of trading by employees of member firms, and the Com-
mission is relieved of administering and enforcing another rule, with its
attendant burdens and costs."23 It would appear reasonable to conclude
that the SEC determined that the NASD rule was sufficient regulation in
this area. It is difficult to infer that the SEC would have withdrawn its
own rule had it thought that the NASD rule would extend less protection
to the investing public. Yet less protection is extended, if the SEC rule is
held to engender private rights of enforcement while the NASD rule is
held not to engender such rights.
Section 15A4 is not specifically exempted from the antitrust laws.
However, section 15A (i) (1) states:
The rules of a registered securities association may provide that no
member thereof shall deal with any nonmember broker or dealer ...
except at the same prices, for the same commissions or fees, and on the
same terms and conditions as are by such member accorded to the general
public. 25
And section 15A(n) provides:
If any provision of this section is in conflict with any provision of any
law of the United States in force on the date this section takes effect, the
provision of this section shall prevail.2 6
In effect, the statute is imposing economic sanctions upon persons ex-
cluded from membership in the NASD. And without the exemption pro-
vided by section 15A(n), these economic sanctions might very well be
deemed to violate the antitrust laws. Where Congress feels that the
policies underlying certain NASD rules are important enough to prevail
over the policies underlying the antitrust laws, such rules would seem im-
portant enough to engender private rights and remedies in persons harmed
by their violation.
Finally, under section 15(b) (10) ,27 which was added to the act by the
1964 amendments, a broker-dealer who is not a member of a registered
22 SEC Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 4924 (1953).
23 Ibid.
24 Securities Exchange Act § 15A, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3
(1964).
25 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(i) (1), 52 Stat. 1073 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(i)(1) (1964).
26 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(n), 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(n) (1964).
27 Securities Exchange Act § 15(b) (10), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(b)(10) (1964).
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securities association is regulated in his purchases and sales of over-the-
counter securities by SEC rules authorized by identical statutory language
and designed to achieve identical statutory purposes as comparable NASD
rules. However, since private actions are sustained under certain SEC
rules, the broker-dealer who is not a member of the NASD may be sub-
jected to private suits, while, for the same offense, his NASD counter-
part may avoid granting redress to the investing public. While this anom-
alous situation may encourage increased membership in the NASD, it
hardly seems consistent with the over-all scheme of statutory regulation.
The case against sustaining a private action, arguing only from the rele-
vant statutory provisions, is less convincing. What is perhaps the most
persuasive argument is based upon the language of sections 15A(b) (9)28
and 15A(b) (10).' These sections of the act, which were amended by
the Congress in 1964, deal in some detail with the disciplining of associa-
tion members and their associates for violations of NASD rules. The stat-
utory language specifically mentions "expulsion, suspension, fine, censure
... or any other fitting penalty,"' but does not appear to contemplate a
private action and remedy. The phrase "any other fitting penalty" juxta-
posed to the words "expulsion, suspension, fine, censure"31 and imme-
diately preceding section 15A(b) (10), which requires the association to
provide a fair and orderly internal judicial procedure to deal with viola-
tions of its rules,"2 is difficult to read as authorizing a private action in the
federal courts. On the other hand, it may be contended that the scheme
of discipline set out in sections 15A(b) (9) and 15A(b) (10) is not neces-
sarily exclusive, and that, in any event, the phrase "any other fitting
penalty" may be interpreted to grant investors a private action.
Another argument, which is not entirely unconvincing, is that Con-
gress could never have intended to create a federal action under such
sweeping language as conduct inconsistent with "just and equitable princi-
ples of trade."3 Under the exclusive jurisdiction provided by section 27
of the act, 4 state courts would be ousted of jurisdiction over all actions
28 Securities Exchange Act § lSA(b) (9), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b)(9) (1964).
29 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b)(10), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 1s U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b)(10) (1964).
80 Securities Exchange Act § 1SA(b)(9), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b)(9) (1964).
31 Ibid.
82 Securities Exchange Act § 1SA(b)(10), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b)(10) (1964).
3 Securities Exchange Act § 1SA(b) (8), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b) (8) (1964); see Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
1 91,351, at 94,900 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,644 (2d Cir. 1966).
84 Securities Exchange Act § 27, 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
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in this area traditionally grounded solely upon state law. 5 Still, the lan-
guage, though broad, is the direct creature of legislative fiat. And, if under
section 15A(b) (4) a broker may be barred from a registered securities
association for "conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles
of trade,"' 6 it would not seem any more drastic to grant a private action
to an investor for violations of this same standard.
Perhaps the most commonly used argument against implying liabilities
and remedies contends that since sections 9(e),ar 16(b) 8 and 18(a)39 of
the act grant express rights of action in certain circumstances, the maxim
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius" denies any implied right of action
under section 15A.4" Moreover, the great majority of actions which have
been judicially implied under the 1934 act have been based upon sections
7(c),41 10(b),42 14(a)43 and 14(b) 44-- all of which include the language
"it shall be unlawful." However, section 28(a) of the act states unequiv-
ocally that "the rights and remedies provided by this title shall be in
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or
in equity,"45 and the United States Supreme Court has for the most part
taken a dim view of the "expressio unius" maxim. Indeed, in a leading
securities case, the Court remarked that such maxims had long "been
subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an
act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in
the light of context and will interpret the text ... to carry out ... the
generally expressed legislative policy.46
Finally, in section 15A(a) (2)" r "rules of the association" is defined and
appears to refer to rules different from those embraced within the phrase
"this title and the rules and regulations thereunder" mentioned almost
35 For a suggested solution to this problem based upon a burden of proof concept, see
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,644 (2d Cir. 1966).
36 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b) (4) (A), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)
(4) (A) (1964).
87 Securities Exchange Act § 9(e), 48 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78(i) (e) (1964).
38 Securities Exchange Act § 16(b), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (b)
(1964).
39 Securities Exchange Act § 18(a), 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1964).
40 Securities Exchange Act § 15A, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3
(1964).
41 Securities Exchange Act § 7(c), 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c)
(1964).
42 Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
43 Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
44 Securities Exchange Act § 14(b), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(b)
(1964).
45 Securities Exchange Act § 28(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964).
46 SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
47'Securities Exchange Act § 15A(a) (2), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(a)(2) (1964).
1966]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
immediately following in section 15A(b) (1).48 Since the latter phrase has
an identical counterpart in section 27, 49 the argument may be made that
"rules and regulations" as used in the jurisdictional section 27 do not in-
clude "rules of the association." The trouble with this argument is that
jurisdiction for actions pursuant to association rules may be based upon
that language in section 27 which authorizes actions "to enforce any...
duty created by this title. .. ."I' Moreover, the fact that Congress knew
how to clearly distinguish the two sets of rules in section 15A may mean
that it had no intention of making such a distinction in section 27.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Once having analyzed the statutory language; it is appropriate to ex-
amine the legislative history to determine the congressional purpose with
respect to a private action pursuant to the rules of a registered securities
association. The Reports of both the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency and the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
which deal with the background and purposes of section 15A of the act,
are identical in emphasizing the vital importance of the over-the-counter
markets, the abuses which had grown up, and the need for remedial
measures.
51
These Reports first analyze in some detail the reasons for enacting sec-
tion 15A of the 1934 act. Almost seven thousand brokers and dealers are
registered with the SEC as transacting business in the over-the-counter
markets, nearly five times the total membership of the New York Stock
Exchange. Approximately 60,000 separate issues of securities are traded
over the counter, ten times the number of issues admitted to trading on
all the stock exchanges in the country. "Moreover, the primary operations
of the great underwriting houses take place over the counter.15 2 Thus, not
only a great variety of securities trade in the over-the-counter markets,
but these markets also "provide the principal channel by which the sav-
ings of the nation flow into new financing.""es The telephone, the telegraph
and the mails link the various regional over-the-counter markets together
in a vast interconnected network, national in scope and of "immense im-
48 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b) (1), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b)(1) (1964).
49 Securities Exchange Act § 27, 48 Stat. 902, 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
<1964).
50 Ibid.
51 S. Rep. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); H.R. Rep. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
(1938).
52 S. Rep. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938); H.R. Rep. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1938).
53 Ibid.
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portance to the national economy... ."I" The conclusion is that the over-
the-counter markets are themselves important enough to justify a reason-
able system of regulation. Another compelling reason for regulation,
however, was succinctly stated in the Senate Banking Committee Report
accompanying the bill which became the 1934 act. 5 The Committee
deemed it imperative to subject over-the-counter activities to the same
regulations which are imposed upon stock exchange transactions. "This
power is vitally necessary to forestall widespread evasion of stock ex-
change regulation by the withdrawal of securities from listing on ex-
changes ... to 'over-the-counter' markets .... I'l
The Committee Reports then proceed to focus upon the abuses which
had grown up in the over-the-counter markets. A small staff of SEC in-
vestigators was sent to Cleveland, Detroit and the Pacific Northwest to
engage in surveys and review complaints. Within the space of a few
months "13 individuals were criminally convicted, 16 more were placed
under indictment, 17 corporations and 41 more individuals were enjoined,
and 2 firms were expelled or obliged to withdraw from national securities
exchanges, all for elementary violations of the law."57
Once having analyzed the reasons for enacting section 15A, the law-
makers describe in some detail the purposes which the legislation is de-
signed to achieve. First is the desire to protect the investor and the
honest broker from the unfair practices of the submarginal elements in
the industry. Second is the necessity to cope with certain unethical meth-
ods of doing business which, while above the bare legal minimum, are
"unfair both to customer and to decent competitor, and are seriously
damaging to the mechanism of the free and open market .... M"8 And
third is the intent to protect the investor and his savings and thereby
protect the financial markets of the nation.
Two alternative methods of realizing these purposes are explored by
the Committees, and a choice is made in favor of private enforcement.
The committee believes that there are two alternative programs by which
this problem could be met. The first would involve a pronounced expansion
of the organization of the Securities and Exchange Commission; the
multiplication of branch offices; a large increase in the expenditure of
public funds; an increase in the problem of avoiding the evils of bureau-
cracy; and a minute, detailed, and rigid regulation of business conduct by
54 Ibid.
65 S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934).
56 Ibid.
57 S. Rep. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1938); H.R. Rep. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 4 (1938).
58 Ibid.
59 S. Rep. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1938); H.R. Rep. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 4-5 (1938).
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law. It might very well mean expanding the present process of registration
of brokers and dealers with the Commission to include the proscription
not only of the dishonest, but also of those unwilling or unable to conform
to rigid standards of financial responsibility, professional conduct, and
technical proficiency. The second of these alternative programs, which the
committee believes distinctly preferable to the first, is embodied in S.3255.
This program is based upon cooperative regulation, in which the task will
be largely performed by representative organizations of investment bankers,
dealers and brokers, with the Government exercising appropriate super-
vision in the public interest, and exercising supplementary powers of direct
regulation. In the concept of a really well organized and well-conducted
stock exchange, under the supervision provided by the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, one may perceive something of the possibilities of such a
program.59
This language is consistent with the remarks of Senator Maloney of Con-
necticut, the sponsor of section 15A, on the floor of the United States
Senate immediately preceding the passage of his bill.
The bill does not propose anything radical in the investment banking field.
It does for that business about what was done for the exchanges through the
Securities Exchange Act. It is not entirely a measure of self-regulation, but
it very clearly provides an opportunity for self-regulation. Actually, it is
cooperative regulation. Under this bill the Federal Government, through the
Securities and Exchange Commission, says to the investment bankers
of the country, "You may create your own association or associations.
You may provide your own rules and your own regulations. We want you
to run your own business. We want a representation, however. We want
a right of review and supervision." So, while some of us would like to call
what is provided for self-regulations it is in effect a cooperative regulation.60
This poses directly the question as to whether or not the legislators in-
tended to authorize a private action pursuant to rules promulgated under
section 15A as a necessary adjunct to private enforcement. A careful
reading of the Senate and House Reports and the floor debates gives no
indication one way or the other. It can be argued that since the private
action is neither mentioned specifically in the statutory language nor in
the legislative history, no such action was intended to be created. More-
over, the tenor of Senator Maloney's statements on the floor of the Senate
is conservative and restricted. The bill is being passed with the blessing
of the investment banking community, and no radical innovations are
contemplated. 61
The truth of the matter is probably that Congress never even con-
sidered the question of a private action pursuant to the rules of a regis-
tered securities association. A number of arguments, however, can be
advanced to the effect that such a private action will assist in the realiza-
tion of the congressional purposes as manifested in the legislative history.
60 83 Cong. Rec. 4451 (1938).
61 Ibid.
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First, the staff of the NASD could not possibly correct the abuses and
realize the purposes as outlined by the legislators without becoming a main-
mouth bureaucracy. Too many issues are traded in the over-the-counter
markets. Too many brokers are registered as doing business in these mar-
kets. The entire gamut of traders and the trading activity is much too
diverse geographically. And such a mammoth bureaucracy is exactly what
the legislators professed to avoid when they chose the method of private
enforcement to effectuate the statutory purposes. 62 If, however, a private
suit and private remedy based on NASD rules are permitted, then the
entire investing public becomes the bureaucracy. Each individual mem-
ber of this group becomes an overseer of the over-the-counter markets
who, in protecting his own interest, will ferret out and bring to light viola-
tions and thereby act as a deterrent to wrongdoing. Second, the specific
purposes as stated in the legislative history are furthered by the private
suit. The submarginal elements in the industry will be less prone to mis-
chief knowing that they may be subjected to a private action and to
damages. The threat of the publicity of a trial in a highly competitive
service business will help to deter unethical practices which barely exceed
the legal minimum. And as suits are brought to recover damages resulting
from these unethical practices, the courts may very well raise the stan-
dards of the duties imposed by this legal minimum on a case-by-case basis.
Also, the private investor and his savings will be more secure with the
legal instrument available to protect and recover his investments. Finally,
the legislators sanctioned the creation of a registered securities associa-
tion as an alternative to expanding the SEC.63 Thus, presumably the
NASD rules are a substitute for the promulgation of additional SEC rules.
Since a private action may be maintained under certain of the latter rules,
the same rights must be accorded the investing public under certain
of the former rules. Otherwise, the public is receiving less protection pur-
suant to section 15A than it would receive under an expanded SEC, and
this was certainly not the legislative purpose.
THE CASES
There is no lack of authority for implying liabilities pursuant to a fed-
eral statute.64 As the United States Supreme Court declared in a leading
decision:
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
62 S. Rep. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1938); H.R. Rep. No. 2307, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 4-5 (1938).63 Ibid.
64 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499
(2d Cir. 1956); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947).
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from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as
to grant the necessary relief.65
The SEC statutes, in particular, have been quite fruitful in engendering
private actions.6 6 Indeed, the greatest flowering of these actions has been
under certain provisions of the 1934 act itself. An examination of the
leading decisions dealing with implied liabilities under this statute may
shed some light on the question of a private action based on section 15A.
The first important decision in this area was Baird v. Franklin," de-
cided by the Second Circuit in 1944. Here the court sustained an action
by private investors against the New York Stock Exchange for its failure
to discipline a member who had violated Exchange rules promulgated
pursuant to section 6 of the act. Section 6 provides that the rules of a
registered securities exchange must include "provision for the expulsion,
suspension or disciplining of a member for conduct ... inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade ... .,69 In addition, exchange rules
must be "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect in-
vestors .... ,7
The court in Baird, although holding that the complaint stated a cause
of action, allowed no recovery, finding that the Exchange's dereliction of
duties was not a proximate cause of plaintiffs' damages. There is no dis-
cussion in the court's opinion as to a possible action against parties other
than the Exchange for violations of duties imposed by section 6. Judge
Clark's concurring opinion, however, emphasized that if the primary
purpose of the act-to completely and effectively protect the investing
public-was to become a reality, then "§ 6(b) must be construed as
granting to injured investors individual causes of action to enforce the
statutory duties imposed upon the exchanges.1 71 Judge Clark then de-
clared:
The fact that the statute provides no machinery or procedure by which the
individual right of action can proceed is immaterial. It is well established
that members of a class for whose protection a statutory duty is created
may sue for injuries resulting from its breach and that the common law
will supply a remedy if the statute gives none.72
While Judge Clark speaks specifically in terms of "duties imposed upon
the exchanges," the policies relied upon to justify a private action against
65 Bell v. Hood, supra note 64, at 684 (1946). [Footnote omitted.]
66 Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
67 See text accompanying notes 68-90 infra.
68 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
6D Securities Exchange Act § 6(b), 48 Stat. 886 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1964).
70 Securities Exchange Act § 6(d), 48 Stat. 886 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1964).
71 Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 US. 737 (1944).
72 Ibid.
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the Exchange for violations of duties prescribed by section 6 would seem
equally applicable to justify private actions against parties other than the
Exchange for violations of similar duties." And once it is determined to
sustain private actions against private persons based upon stock exchange
rules, similar policies and logic would appear to support the same actions
pursuant to NASD rules.
The next landmark decision in this area was Kardon v. National Gyp-
sum Co.,74 decided by Judge Kirkpatrick in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania in 1946. Here plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had induced
them, by means of fraudulent misrepresentations, to sell certain securities
to the defendants at substantial discounts in value. Plaintiffs sought dam-
ages, claiming that the defendants had violated section 10(b) of the act7
and rule 10b-576 promulgated thereunder. Broadly stated, section 10(b)
of the act and rule 10b-5 prohibit fraud, deceit, and material misrepre-
sentations or omissions by any person in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security. The court sustained plaintiff's action, following a line
of reasoning similar to that employed in Baird v. Franklin. There was no
question that defendants' conduct clearly violated section 10(b) and rule
10b-5. Nor was there any dispute that section 10(b) did not expressly
allow civil suits by persons injured as a result of its violation.
However, "The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited
act, or by failing to do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion
of an interest of another if; (a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively
or in part to protect an interest of the other as an individual; and (b) the
interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect. .. ."
Restatement, Torts, Vol. 2, Sec. 286. This rule is more than merely a canon
of statutory interpretation. The disregard of the command of a statute is a
wrongful act and a tort.77
The court swept aside the "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" argument
based upon the express provisions for a civil action contained in sections
9(e), 16(b) and 18(a) of the act. The whole question was not one of
statutory interpretation, but "whether an intention can be implied to deny
a remedy and to wipe out a liability which, normally, by virtue of basic
principles of tort law accompanies the doing of the prohibited act."" The
court emphasized that where one vital purpose of the act was to eliminate
manipulative and deceptive methods by regulation, the defendants' con-
78 See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 91,644 (2d Cir.
1966); Lowenfels, "Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules," 66 Colum. L. Rev-
12 (1966).
74 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.). Pa. 1946).
75 Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
76 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
77 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
78 Id. at 514.
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tenfions that no private action could be sustained pursuant to section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 must not prevail. Today, it is settled in virtually
every circuit that an implied private remedy may be granted for damages
resulting from the violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 9
The development of the doctrine of implied liabilities under the 1934
act was further extended in 1948 by the decision of the Federal District
Court in Massachusetts in Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp. 0 Relying upon
Baird v. Franklin and Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., Judge Wyzanski
held, that where a broker had arranged excessive bank credit for a cus-
tomer in violation of Federal Reserve Board regulations, the customer
could maintain a private action against the broker pursuant to sec-
tion 7(c) 1 of the act for damages suffered as a proximate consequence
of the violation. Section 7(c) makes it unlawful for certain brokers;
directly or indirectly, to extend or maintain, or arrange for the extension
or maintenance of, credit to any customer with respect to a registered
security in contravention of rules promulgated by the Federal Reserve
Board. The court's reasoning had a familiar ring:
The Securities and [sic] Exchange Act does not expressly give a right or
remedy to a private person injured by § 7 (c) of that Act. But such a right
may nonetheless be implied. . . . The general principle regarding civil
liability for violations of prohibitory statutes .... is that where defendant's
violation of a prohibitory statute has caused injury to plaintiff the latter has
a right of action if one of the purposes of the enactment was to protect
individual interests like the plaintiff's.8 2
These holdings by federal district and appellate courts were climaxed
in 1964 by the Supreme Court's decision in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak.8 3 Here
a stockholder initiated a civil action in federal court claiming deprivation
of his preemptive rights by reason of a merger effected through the use
of a false and misleading proxy statement. Plaintiff alleged a violation of
section 14(a) of the 1934 act with reference to the proxy solicitation ma-
terial and asserted federal jurisdiction based upon section 27. Section
79 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195
(5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne,
307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Errion v.
Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Estate Counseling Serv. Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962). In addition, dictum in other circuits and
acceptance by federal district courts indicates approval of the doctrine of implied civil liabil-
ity pursuant to Rule 10b-S. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wis.
1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Nash v. J. Arthur Warner & Co., 137 F. Supp.
615 (D. Mass. 1955); Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954), appeal dismissed,
222 F.2d 464 (4th Cirv 1955).
80 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949).
81 Securities Exchange Act § 7(c), 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c)
(1964).
82 Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949).
83 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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14(a) makes it unlawful "... for any person.., in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe ... for the pro-
tection of investors, to solicit ...any proxy." 4 SEC Rule 14a-9 pro-
hibits proxy solicitations which contain any false or misleading statements
or any material omissions.85 Section 27 grants the federal district courts
jurisdiction over "all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created" under the act.86
The Supreme Court sustained plaintiff's federal cause of action. "It
appears clear," declared the Court, "that private parties have a right
under § 27 to bring suit for violation of § 14(a) of the Act."'87 The latter
section was designed to prevent management or other persons from ob-
taining authorization for corporate action by means of misleading proxy
materials. While the language of section 14(a) makes no specific reference
to a private action, the phrase "the protection of investors" clearly im-
plies the "availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that
result."88 The Court quoted its own decision in Deckert v. Independent
Shares Corp.:8
The power to enforce implies the power to make effective the right of
recovery afforded by the Act. And the power to make the right of re-
covery effective implies the power to utilize any of the procedures or
actions normally available to the litigant according to the exigencies of
the particular case.90
The first and only case to deal directly with the issue of a private action
based on NASD rules was Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & CoP.9 The
opinion of Judge Croake in the district court, however, abruptly reversed
what had appeared to be the dominant trend. Judge Croake held unequiv-
ocally that a customer suing his broker for damages resulting from con-
duct allegedly inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade
within the meaning of section 15A(b) (8) of the 1934 act did not state a
federal claim. Plaintiff's argument had relied primarily upon the authority
of Bell v. Hood and Baird v. Franklin. It contended that the actions com-
plained of-selling securities in a margin account in violation of a written
agreement not to do so unless the equity owned fell below prevailing
84 Securities Exchange Act § 14(a), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
85 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1964).
86 Securities Exchange Act § 27, 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
87 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964).
88 Id. at 432.
89 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
90 J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra note 87, at 433-34. For private actions under other
sections of the 1934 act, see Hawkins v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp.
104 (WD. Ark. 1949) (§ 11(d) (2)); Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Midwest Stock Exch.,
178 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (§ 12(f)).
91 CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. fI 91,351 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,644-
(2d Cir. 1966).
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margin requirements-justified a federal, civil remedy, since federal law
had been violated and a member of the class which such law sought to
protect had been injured. More specifically, plaintiff alleged that as a
member of the NASD defendant was subject to its rules; and since these
rules had been promulgated pursuant to section 15A, allegations of their
breach stated causes of action under section 27. The court disagreed, find-
ing that the violations attributed to defendants justified claims grounded
upon state law, but not upon a federal statute. The court made a number
of statements that must be examined with care. First, the court wrote:
Section... IA of the [1934] Act... do[es] not explicitly impose duties
upon brokers, but rather require [s] . . .national securities associations
registered under the Act ... to promulgate rules requiring their members
to abide by "fair and equitable principles of trade." 92
This statement appears to be self-contradictory. If national securities as-
sociations are required by the 1934 act to promulgate rules requiring
member firms to adhere to certain standards of conduct, it would seem
that this statute is imposing duties upon these member firms. Indeed, the
1934 act imposes standards in many areas-fraud, disclosure, credit,
maintenance of records, to name but a few-and these standards em-
bodied in NASD rules are duties created by the 1934 act. Since such
standards are embodied in NASD rules primarily to guide the conduct
of member firms in their relations with the investing public, it seems
erroneous not to conclude that section iA imposes duties running from
the member firms to the investing public.
The court also stated:
Furthermore, the rules of the ... NASD, which defendant is alleged to
have violated, were not intended to be included within the phrase "rules
and regulations" contained in Section 27. It is obvious that that phrase
applies only to rules and regulations promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. Section 23(a) of the Act grants those two agencies power to
promulgate "rules and regulations" whereas Section . .. IA speak[s] in
terms of "rules" of an... association as distinct from "rules and regulations"
promulgated by the Commission.93
Why is it so obvious that section 27 differentiates between rules of the
NASD and rules of the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board? We have
already noted that the legislators knew how to make such a distinction
clear in sections 15A(a) (2) and 15A(b) (1). 4 The fact that section 27
makes no such distinction may just as easily be read to support an in-
92 Colonial Realty Corp. v. bache & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,351, at 94,500
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
93 Ibid. [Footnote omitted.]
94 See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
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terpretation opposed to that of the court. More important, however, is
the language in section 27 that the federal district courts shall have juris-
diction of suits "brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
title or the rules and regulations thereunder."95 The court did not men-
tion this portion of section 2 7. Baird v. Franklin was distinguished on the
grounds that the liability of the New York Stock Exchange in that deci-
sion "was predicated upon the duty of supervision of its members directly
imposed upon it by Section 6(b), whereas in the instant case liability is
asserted as to a [person] ... upon whom no direct duty is imposed by the
Act." '96 Judge Croake went on to articulate the policies underlying his
decision, arguing that Congress could never have intended to give federal
claims carrying exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts to customers
against brokers for violations of such a sweeping standard as "just and
equitable principles of trade." The doctrine of Bell v. Hood was "not
without limitation.197 The claims of plaintiff were grounded primarily
upon state law; plaintiff's federal allegations were "merely reiterations
of the common law claims. 98
On March 10, 1966, the district court's judgment in Colonial Realty
Corp. v. Bache & Co. was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. 9 Judge Friendly's opinion, however, virtually re-
versed Judge Croake's holding. After summarizing the arguments for both
sides, the court wrote:
What emerges is that whether the courts are to imply federal civil liability
for violation of exchange or dealer association rules by a member cannot be
determined on the simplistic all-or-nothing basis urged by the two parties;
rather the court must look to the nature of the particular rule and its
place in the regulatory scheme, with the party urging the implication of
a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of persuasion than
when the violation is of the statute or an SEC regulation. The case for
implication would be strongest when the rule imposes an explicit duty
unknown to the common law. o6
The court went on to state that the particular rules at issue, which im-
posed duties upon member firms not to engage in conduct inconsistent
95 Securities Exchange Act § 27, 48 Stat. 902-03 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1964).
96 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 91,351, at 94,500
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
97 Ibid. To support this proposition the Court cited Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507(S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957), which
had been uniformly criticized by the commentators, see 2 Loss, Securities Regulation 949-52(1961), and was recently overruled; see Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 11 91,657 (2d Cir. 1966).
98 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Brache & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 9f 91,351, at 94,500
(SD).N.Y. 1964).
99 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 91,644 (2d Cir. 1966).
10 Id. at 95,402.
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with fair and equitable principles of trade, were something of a "catch-
all," which imposed ethical as well as legal standards. "We find little rea-
son to believe," concluded the court, "that by requiring exchanges and
dealers' associations to include such provisions in their rules Congress
meant to impose a new legal standard on members different from that
long recognized by state law."1"1 Judge Friendly was particularly wary of
saddling the federal courts with garden-variety customer-broker suits
where no traditional basis for federal jurisdiction existed. The court ap-
pears to have left this problem to be resolved in the future on a case-by-
case basis depending upon burden of proof, with the burden being the
lightest where the rule at issue imposes a specific duty unknown to the
common law.
In effect, the Second Circuit held, that while plaintiff in the case at bar
had not satisfied the heavy burden of proof required to establish a federal
claim under certain association rules, such a claim might be recognized
in the future based upon other association rules depending upon "the na-
ture of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme ...... o2
A SUGGESTED ANALYSIS
When the standard set out by the Court of Appeals in Colonial Realty
is applied to the specific scheme of NASD regulation, the most fruitful
approach appears to be to sustain private actions based upon certain
NASD rules and not to sustain such actions based upon other NASD
rules. In other words, the NASD rules which are promulgated for the
direct protection of the investing public should engender private actions,
while the NASD rules which are promulgated merely as "housekeeping"
devices to regulate the technicalities of the members' day-to-day business
activities should not engender such actions. With respect to those rules
promulgated for the direct protection of the investing public, the case for
an implied private action should be strongest when the rule at issue im-
poses an explicit duty unknown to the common law. The logic and policy
supporting such a distinction seem valid. Under one set of rules the in-
vesting public is really a third party beneficiary of duties imposed upon
the member firms and as such is entitled to enforce its rights. Under the
other set of rules the investing public has no such status and no compa-
rable interests which justify protection in the courts.
If the above reasoning is applied to presently existing NASD rules,
there is a very logical dichotomy between the Rules of Fair Practice,
which should engender private actions, and the Uniform Practice Code,
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
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which should not engender such actions. The purposes of the Rules of
Fair Practice are described in the NASD's Bylaws:
To promote and enforce just and equitable principles of trade and busi-
ness, to maintain high standards of commercial honor and integrity among
members ... to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices,
to provide safeguards against unreasonable profits or unreasonable rates
of commissions or other charges, to protect investors and the public interest,
to collaborate with governmental and other agencies in the promotion of
fair practices and the elimination of fraud, and in general to carry out
the purposes of... Section 15A of the Act .... 103
This language is a paraphrase of section 15A(b) (8) of the 1934 act and
is concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the investing public.
The rules themselves cover many facets of the relationship between the
member firm and the public. Among the more important rules are those
which prohibit the most flagrant abuses of the selling relationship. Sales
by misrepresentations are prohibited by language similar to the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.'0 Excessive trading in discretion-
ary accounts is banned by a rule which, with respect to such an account,
prohibits "any transactions of purchase or sale which are excessive in size
or frequency in view of the financial resources and character of such ac-
count."' 05 This rule specifically relates only to those accounts where the
member is vested with discretionary power. Recommendations by sales-
men which lead to excessive trading as well as to purchases which are in-
appropriate to the particular investor's circumstances run afoul of the
NASD's "suitability" rule which provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if
any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as to
his financial situation and needs.10
The member's responsibility to oversee his salesmen's activities is enun-
ciated as follows:
A member who employs any registered representative shall supervise all
his transactions and all correspondence relating thereto. All transactions
made by a registered representative with or for a customer shall be ap-
proved by a partner, a duly accredited executive, or a branch office manager
of such member .... 10T
Other NASD Rules of Fair Practice govern certain disclosure aspects of
selling practices, such as the rules requiring every member to inform his
103 Art. VII, § 1, NASD Manual C-39.
104 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. 11, § 18, NASD Manual D-10.
105 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 15(a), NASD Manual D-8.
108 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. I1, § 2, NASD Manual D-5.
107 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 27(a), NASD Manual D-18.
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customers whether he is acting as a broker or dealer at or before the
completion of each transaction,"°8 whether he is in a control relationship
with the issuer of the security which he is trading,109 or whether he has an
interest in a primary or secondary distribution of securities which he is
selling." 0
There are still further rules which focus upon additional problems aris-
ing out of the relationship between member firms and the investing pub-
lic. Charges to customers for services performed must be "reasonable and
not unfairly discriminatory between customers.""' A member acting for
his own account in transactions with customers must buy and sell at prices
which are "fair, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances
.... ,112 No member may extend an offer to buy or sell unless he is pre-
pared to act upon his offer as extended.1 3 Funds and securities of cus-
tomers must be properly maintained and safeguarded. 114 And no member
may give anything of value to any person for the purpose of circulating
material which will affect the market price of a security."'
The purposes of the Uniform Practice Code as described in the NASD's
Bylaws are substantially different from the purposes of the Rules of
Fair Practice.
[T] o make uniform, where practicable, custom, practice, usage, and trading
technique in the investment banking and securities business with respect
to such matters as trade terms, deliveries, payments, dividends, rights,
interest, reclamations, exchange of confirmations, stamp taxes, claims,
assignments, powers of substitution, computation of interest and basis
prices, due-bills, transfer fees, "when, as and if issued" trading, "when, as
and is distributed" trading, marking to the market and close-out procedure,
all to the end that the transaction of day-to-day business -by members, may
be simplified and facilitated, that business disputes and misunderstandings,
which arise from uncertainty and lack of uniformity in such matters, may
be eliminated .... I'l
The primary purpose of the Code is to regulate the day-to-day mechanics
of business dealings among member firms. The Code itself is a com-
pendium of technical regulations having comparatively little direct impact
upon the investing public. Many intricate technical problems are covered,
such as when transactions in bonds which are traded "flat" shall be "ex-
interest,"1 7 how the settlement price of contracts in "part-redeemed"
108 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 12, NASD Manual D-8.
109 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 13, NASD Manual D-8.
110 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 14, NASD Manual D-8.
111 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 3, NASD Manual D-5.
112 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 4, NASD Manual D-6.
11- NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 6, NASD Manual D-6.
114 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 19(a), NASD Manual D-10.
115 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 11, NASD Manual D-7.
126 Art. XIV, § 1, NASD Manual C-49.
117 NASD Uniform Practice Code § 6(a), NASD Manual F-4.
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bonds shall be determined,"" how a confirmation covering a transaction
in a security "when, as and if issued" shall identify the security," 9 and
how the assignment and each power of substitution pertaining to a certifi-
cate of a company whose transfer books are closed indefinitely shall be
acknowledged. 2 ° Without going into an extensive compilation, it seems
clear that the Uniform Practice Code does not include the kinds of rules
that should engender private rights in members of the investing public.
These rules do not satisfy the crucial test for implied liabilities pursuant
to NASD rules-that the rule in question be designed for the direct pro-
tection of the investing public. Moreover, it would appear that a violation
of the rules contained in the Code will seldom, if ever, be a proximate
cause of injury to a member of the public.
Once admitting that there are certain NASD rules which justify im-
plying liabilities, the next problem is to assess the practical impact of
this admission upon the individual investor. First and foremost, the pri-
vate action based on NASD rules will give this investor a federal remedy
which never before existed. Under present practice the investor who is
harmed by a member firm's violation of NASD rules files a written com-
plaint with one of the NASD's District Business Conduct Committees.' 2 '
A copy of these allegations is forwarded to the member firm and the latter
is given an opportunity to file a written reply.'22 Either party, or the Com-
mittee itself, may request a hearing. 28 After due deliberations, the Dis-
trict Committee is empowered to render a decision and affix a penalty.'24
These decisions may be appealed to the NASD's Board of Governors 25
and ultimately to the SEC.'26 While at first glance this procedure appears
adequate to protect the public investor, there is one crucial omission. All
of the permissible penalties--censure, fine, suspension, expulsion, revoca-
tion-while sufficient to punish the member firm, make no provision for
awarding damages to the aggrieved investor.' It is not surprising, there-
fore, that there have been a very limited number of public complaints for
violations of NASD rules. 2 As the recent Report of Special Study of
Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission has em-
phasized:
118 NASD Uniform Practice Code § 8, NASD Manual F-5.
119 NASD Uniform Practice Code § 11, NASD Manual F-5, -6.
120 NASD Uniform Practice Code § 31, NASD Manual F-12.
121 NASD Code of Procedure § 4, NASD Manual E-2.
122 NASD Code of Procedure § 6, NASD Manual E-2.
123 NASD Code of Procedure § 8, NASD Manual E-3.
124 NASD Code of Procedure § 11, NASD Manual E-4.
125 NASD Code of Procedure § 14(a), NASD Manual E-7.
126 NASD Code of Procedure § 19, NASD Manual E-10.
127 NASD Rules of Fair Practice Art. V, § 1, NASD Manual D-29.
128 H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 663 (1963).
129 H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 664 (1963).
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[A]ithough NASD staff and committee officials may offer a degree of
assistance in the preparation of formal complaints and prosecution of the
case, the responsibility for proceeding and carrying the case forward lies
largely with the public complainant. Many potential complainants are
unquestionably discouraged from going forward by the burdens involved
in assuming that role, especially since this procedure will not result in
restitution or other benefit to the complainant."
A private action based on NASD rules will broaden the substantive
scope of investor protection. While certain NASD rules have their coun-
terparts in common law claims, or in SEC regulations pursuant to which
a private action may be sustained, such vital NASD rules as the suitability
and supervisory rules quoted above have no common law or SEC counter-
parts. Moreover, the substantial advantages with respect to service of
process and venue accruing to plaintiffs basing their actions on the 1934
act are not applicable to common law claimants. 80
CONCLUSION
The regulation of the over-the-counter securities markets has become
an issue of paramount importance in recent years. The vast number of
companies whose securities are traded in these markets together with their
inherent geographical diversity have made the regulatory task consider-
ably more difficult in this area than with respect to the stock exchanges.
This is clearly illustrated by the numerous examples of abuses described
in the Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.'' The solution, unfortunately, is not simple. To
create a vast governmental bureaucracy to oversee the over-the-counter
markets would be anathema to our traditions as well as contradictory to
the declared legislative purpose. Delegating the entire regulatory responsi-
bility to the NASD has proven to be less than completely satisfactory.13 2
Perhaps the answer lies in an expanded concept of private enforcement
spearheaded by private actions by investors pursuant to the rules of the
NASD.
The development of the law in this area of implied liabilities and reme-
dies pursuant to the federal securities acts has undergone tremendous
growth and expansion in recent years. Many courts have recognized that
such growth is vital if the securities acts are to accomplish their avowed
purpose of fully protecting the investing public. The NASD's charter
has the following stated objects and purposes:
130 See Lowenfels, "Rule 10b-5 and the Stockholder's Derivative Action," 18 Vand. L.
Rev. 893 (1965).
131 H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 268-330, 487-560 (1963).
132 H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, at 646-82 (1963).
133 Art. III, NASD Manual C-I.
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(1) ... to promote . . ..high standards of commercial honor, and to
encourage and promote among members observance of Federal and State
securities laws;
(2) To provide a medium through which its membership may be
enabled to confer, consult, and cooperate with governmental and other
agencies in the solution of problems affecting investors, the public, and
the investment banking and securities business;
(3) To adopt, administer and enforce rules of fair practice and rules
to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, and in general
to promote just and equitable principles of trade for the protection of
investors;
(4) To... adjust grievances between the public and members
(5) To establish, and to register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission as, a national securities association pursuant to Section 15A
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and thereby to provide
a medium for effectuating the purposes of said section . . .3
To sustain private actions pursuant to NASD Rules of Fair Practice
would be consistent with these purposes as well as with the fundamental
policies underlying the federal securities laws.
